![\"dmca-google-s1\"](\"https:\/\/www.cryptocabaret.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/dmca-google-s1.png\")
In common with many services provided by Google, its search engine is wide open and free of charge at the point of delivery. <\/p>\nIn common with many services provided by Google, its search engine is wide open and free of charge at the point of delivery. <\/p>\n
The quid pro quo<\/em> is the user\u2019s consumption of Google ads, placed by millions of advertisers for all kinds of products. <\/p>\n Given the scale, it\u2019s no surprise that some offer products of dubious origin. The question is who can be held liable beyond the seller, and under what specific circumstances.<\/p>\n In June 2024, some of the world\u2019s largest publishers came together in a joint lawsuit<\/a> targeting Google. In a complaint filed at a New York federal court, companies including Cengage Learning, Macmillan Learning, Elsevier, and McGraw Hill bemoaned Google\u2019s \u2018systemic and pervasive advertising\u2019 of infringing copies of their copyrighted textbooks.<\/p>\n The publishers\u2019 allegations concerning Google Shopping describe ads that use unauthorized images of the publishers\u2019 genuine textbooks, some with visible trademarks, to promote sales of pirated copies. A \u2018bait-and-switch\u2019 by Google, the publishers allege. More generally, the publishers claim that Google searches for their textbook titles return piracy-heavy results, making their original products more difficult to find.<\/p>\n The publishers claim \u2018pirate\u2019 ad takedown notices were sent repeatedly to Google, but to little effect. Notifications identifying specific \u2018pirate sellers\u2019 as repeat infringers didn\u2019t lead to Google terminating their accounts \u201cwithin a reasonable time, if at all.\u201d <\/p>\n In a recent motion to dismiss, Google sought to thin out the publishers\u2019 claims, which include vicarious copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and violation of New York\u2019s deceptive business practices law.<\/p>\n In an opinion and order handed down this week, United States District Judge Jennifer L. Rochon analyzes the publishers\u2019 claims and relevant legal precedents. Google believes the publishers\u2019 vicarious copyright infringement claim should be dismissed; the Judge put that to the test.<\/p>\n A vicarious copyright infringement claim must contain two elements:<\/p>\n \u2022 The right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct and Google moved to dismiss based on the publishers\u2019 alleged failure to plead both elements. The Court had no need to go further than the first.<\/p>\n A finding of vicarious liability in this case turns on Google\u2019s relationship to the pirate textbook sellers (direct infringers), not just the infringement itself. The first element must show that Google had the ability to supervise or control the third parties\u2019 infringing activity yet failed to do so.<\/p>\n Google says that because the alleged direct infringement (sales of pirated textbooks) took place on the pirate sellers\u2019 third-party websites, it\u2019s clear that its ability to supervise or control doesn\u2019t extend that far.<\/p>\n Citing precedents such as Perfect 10 v. Amazon and Perfect 10 v. Visa, Judge Rochon agrees with Google.<\/p>\n In these cases, the ability to terminate an advertising or payment processing relationship, which might indirectly reduce infringement on third-party websites, was not considered to be the \u2018direct control\u2019 over infringing activity required for a claim of vicarious liability.<\/p>\n In cases including Napster, the opposite was true due to the infringement taking place on a system under Napster\u2019s control, where it had the right to terminate access. <\/p>\n The Court accepts that the removal of infringing ads and the termination of accounts may have an indirect effect by reducing traffic to the pirate sellers\u2019 websites. However, that doesn\u2019t mean that Google has any control over the websites where the infringement takes place, or that any measures applied to search would change that.<\/p>\n \u201cThe fact that \u2018search engines [can] effectively cause a website to disappear by removing it from their search results\u2019 is not enough to give rise to vicarious liability,\u201d the order reads.<\/p>\n \u201cPlaintiffs have not adequately pleaded that Google has sufficient ability to control or supervise the Pirate Sellers\u2019 infringement, and therefore, Plaintiffs\u2019 vicarious copyright infringement claim fails to state a claim.\u201d<\/p>\n Google\u2019s request to dismiss the publishers\u2019 trademark claim was rejected.<\/p>\n The publishers\u2019 claim under 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1114(1)(b)<\/a> relates to \u201cadvertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services\u201d when such use is likely to \u201ccause confusion or deceive.\u201d<\/p>\n The plaintiffs claim that Google included unauthorized reproductions of their trademarks in the pirate sellers\u2019 ads, having acquired the images containing the marks from the sellers themselves. Google denied that, insisting that it only displayed images where the marks were already applied.<\/p>\n The Court found that the publishers had sufficiently pleaded their direct trademark infringement claim, so this element of Google\u2019s motion to dismiss was denied.<\/p>\n The case will continue with the trademark claim intact, alongside a contributory copyright infringement claim that was not included in Google\u2019s motion to dismiss.<\/p>\n Judge Rochon\u2019s opinion and order is available here<\/a> (pdf)<\/em><\/p>\n From: TF<\/a>, for the latest news on copyright battles, piracy and more.<\/p>\nTextbook Pirates<\/h2>\n
Google\u2019s Motion to Dismiss<\/h2>\n
\n\u2022 Direct financial interest in the infringing activity<\/p>\nAbility to Supervise or Control<\/h2>\n
Indirect Effect is Insufficient<\/h2>\n
Court Denies Request to Dismiss Trademark Claim<\/h2>\n